

Thursday, 6 September

Acting

1. NSC Meeting, White House, at 1030.
2. Emphasized at Special Group Meeting continuing necessity for prompt notification of Group members in the event of untoward incidents. This followed Colonel Steakley's briefing of the Group on what had occurred in the Sakhalin incident. (Special Group Minutes)
3. Informed President and Secretaries of State and Defense that more detailed readout of 29 August mission led our analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site -- possibly <sup>surface</sup> surface-to-air ~~air~~ at Banes. Since no similar weapon had ever been identified in U-2 photography of the USSR, programs were set in motion to acquire characteristics and range of the missiles. (Lehman Report p. 10, Para. 21) and (Calendar Sheet)

White House put complete freeze on information <sup>but</sup> and Bundy gave OK to put the analysts to work on providing information to the policy-makers on a need-to-know basis but without normal distribution.

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